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The body, the gaze and
the theorist: remarks on a
strategic distinction
Julia Lossau
Geographisches Institut, Universita¨t Heidelberg
While emotions have become a relevant, even fashionable topic in Anglo-American geography in
recent years, German-speaking scholars are more reluctant to take on board the lessons of emotional
and sensual perception. This reluctance became especially obvious in 2001, when the German-
speaking realm witnessed an unusually fierce debate over the value of the aesthetic for the discipli-
ne’s system of thought. While the protagonists of emotional and aesthetic thinking celebrated an
increasing significance of the ‘softer’ and more bodily aspects of knowledge, the antagonists criti-
cized what they regard as a return to the traditional paradigm of Landschaftsgeographie and its
conservative ideology. While fully sympathetic to the critique of an allegedly aesthetic ‘geomantic
geography’, this paper demonstrates that considering questions of aesthetics does not necessarily
imply a revitalization of ancient paradigms, but can lead instead to a challenging of formerly
taken-for-granted epistemological foundations. To achieve this goal, this paper summarizes the
German debate, highlighting the antagonists’ distinction between a cognitive and scientific realm,
on the one hand, and an aesthetic, pre-scientific or everyday realm, on the other. The deconstruction
of this distinction leads to a more complex notion of the relations between aesthetic and cognitive
spheres, or between the body and the gaze. The acknowledgement of this complexity can, in turn,
be regarded as a point of departure for ways of thinking between the body and the gaze. Broadening
the perspective towards such an in-between point of view does not only reveal certain absences
within the dominant approaches to German-speaking geography, but provides a critical appraisal
of some lines of argument within the Anglo-American preoccupation with the emotions.
I n various disciplines emotions have long been a topic of research. Compared to thefeelings, fears and phobias of everyday life, the emotions of researchers, particularly
with regards to their objects of study, have been of much less interest. In geography, as
in many other fields, these emotions have been hushed up and implicitly or explicitly
regarded as obstacle e´piste´mologique – as a barrier to scientific insight.1 In recent years,
though, both the subjective nature of much research and the influence of emotions on
the research process have been given more serious attention. Especially in the Anglo-
American realm, the (researchers’) emotions have become relevant, even fashionable,
both methodologically and as an area for geographical research, figuring as a focal
point in written statements and oral debate.2 Paying attention to ‘the emotions as ways
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of knowing, being and doing in the broadest sense; and using this to take geographical
knowledges . . .beyond their more usual visual, textual and linguistic domains’,3 the
scholars concerned both criticize the traditional notion of the ‘emotionless researcher’
and express frustration ‘with those aspects of cultural geography which seem (to some)
to be esoteric, inward-looking and apparently oblivious to any real world’.4
Compared to what can perhaps be represented as a recent ‘emotional turn’ within
Anglo-American geography, German-speaking scholars are more reluctant to take on
board the lessons of emotional and sensual perception. This reluctancebecame especially
obvious in 2001, when the German-speaking realm witnessed an unusually fierce debate
over the value of the aesthetic for thediscipline’s systemof thought. Although the contents
of this debate have been almost as complex as the aesthetic itself, it can be reduced, if only
for heuristic reasons, to two main lines of argument represented by two prominent scho-
lars: oneproposing andoneopposing ‘aesthetic thinking’ in geography.5 Theprotagonist,
Ju¨rgenHasse, regards an ‘aesthetic rationality’ as essential for any geographical reasoning
in the present era.6 In his opinion, reality itself has fundamentally changed in postmodern
times, showing more and more aesthetic qualities. As a consequence, he pleads for
aesthetic instruments of apprehension, equating ‘aesthetic’ alternately with ‘emotional’,
‘artistic’ or ‘sensual’, and defining it ‘as the other of reason and language’.7
Due to the substantial but blurred semantic dominion of the aesthetic in Hasse’s writ-
ings, two figures can be introduced here. While that of the body will henceforth stand
for the aesthetic, the gazewill serve asmetaphor for the realmof reason. It can be assumed
that Hasse would approve of these figures: the (feeling-)body stands at the heart of his
emotional approach to geography, and the gaze is widely regarded as a symbol of reason.
Hasse’s aim, however, to renew geography on aesthetic grounds – the switchover to the
body – is vehemently opposed by the antagonist, Gerhard Hard. According to Hard,
Hasse’s sensual approach, first, is characterized by a melancholic critique of progress
and civilization and, secondly, reproduces the traditional geographical concept of ‘space’,
epitomized in the holistically perceived Landschaft as the organic custodian of political,
social and economic development. As such, Hasse’s writings, for Hard, first and foremost
represent ‘a revitalization of some . . . aspects of the German Landschaftsgeographie
of the 1920s and 1930s’.8
At first sight, the opponent seems to provide a consistent and resounding critique. The
‘aesthetic geography’ proposed by Hasse can indeed be said to show both normative and
methodological parallels to the traditional paradigm of Landschaftsgeographie.9 While
the critique of the ‘new aesthetic geography’ is hence both legitimate and necessary, clo-
ser consideration reveals some shortcomings in Hard’s argument. The antagonist follows
the stringent logic of a theory of science, one that replaced the paradigm of Landschafts-
geographiewithin German geography as late as the end of the 1960s. In accordance with
this logic, which continues to inform the most powerful approaches within German-
speaking geography, the antagonist has to discriminate strategically between a cognitive
and scientific realm, on the one hand, and an aesthetic, pre-scientific or everyday realm,
on the other. Put differently, along with a theoretical background that sharply discerns
between the social and the material word, Hard cannot but reduce the relations between
the gaze and the body to a strategic and exclusionary dichotomy of either/or.
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Against this background, the following paper is an attempt to expose the unavoidable
interdependence between the supposed polarities. In accordance with feminist and
postcolonial strategiesof challenging ready-madeopposites, its theoreticalposition is cha-
racterized by two premises. First, underlining the complex relations between the body
and the gaze is aimed neither at dialectically reconciling the two sides of the demarcation
line nor at dismissing the discursive ‘properties’ on either side of the divide. What is at
issue, instead, is an attempt to work with the antagonism in order to show that it implies
a ‘false dichotomy’: that the demarcation line can never be fixed but always remains sub-
ject of discursive definition and redefinition. Put differently, what is at issue is making use
of the antagonism to render it both productive andprogressive for its owndeconstruction.
Secondly, and as a consequence,workingwith the ‘properties’ of either side of the demar-
cation line is not intended to reduce the multiple meanings of the rational and the aes-
thetic to a predetermined and definite content. On the contrary, the semantic diversity
of both terms will be highlighted and, thus, happily endured – rather than limited.10
It is in this vein that the demarcation line between supposedly supreme scientific cog-
nition and pre-scientific or everyday aesthetic perception will be deconstructed. In
doing so, more ‘circumspect’ ways of coming to terms with the aesthetic will be pre-
sented, and the viewpoints of the two parties involved in the current debate will be
confronted with another – an in-between – perspective. To achieve this goal, the paper
consists of four steps. In the next section, I provide a discussion of the German debate,
highlighting Hard’s valuing distinction between a scientific realm on the one hand and
an aesthetic realm on the other. The deconstruction of this distinction, undertaken in
the third section, not only reveals its contingent character but leads to a more complex
notion of the relations between cognitive and aesthetic discourses. Recognizing this
complexity leads, in turn, to a perspective operating between body and gaze (section
four). The relevance of this perspective – not only for the German-speaking context but
also for the Anglo-American one where the emotions are now of considerable interest –
will be sketched out in the conclusion.
Discussing the German debate
At first sight, discussion of the ‘aesthetic debate’ might seem of little importance. Argu-
ments about the aesthetic dimension do not match the major paradigmatic debates,
which mainly revolve around different theoretical approaches to space, place and
region.11 The dominant arguments are informed by social theories, most obvious per-
haps in the popularity of Benno Werlen’s ‘social geography of everyday regionaliza-
tions’,12 sharply discerning the ontological modes of the material, the subjective and
the social (as already sketched out by Popper). The related social-scientific approaches
are, however, challenged from at least two sides. At the one and rather marginal side, a
number of ‘traditional’ geographers, many of them physical geographers, still keep hold
of the traditional ‘one-worldism’ which lacks the stringent distinction of a physical
world on the one hand and a social or subjective world on the other.13 On the other
side, there is the rather recent import of cultural theories. By replacing the distinct
worlds of social science (and, of course, the holistic ‘one world’ of the traditional
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paradigm) with a paradigmatic multiplicity of innumerable and incommensurable world
views, many scholars replace the traditional notion of objective truth with the concept of
situated and partial knowledge. Notwithstanding the quantity of articles meanwhile
published in this guise, though, the influence of the social-scientific viewpoint on the
paradigmatic debates within German-speaking geography remains strong.14
Compared to the discussions and developments at this broad level of debate, the ‘aes-
thetic debate’ indeed seems to be of an esoteric nature, addressing quaint topics of
mere historical interest. Nonetheless, it has caused considerable turmoil in the Ger-
man-speaking geographical community. Controversies over the initial intervention
led to the installation of a discussion website,15 and the journal Erdkunde devoted
an issue to questions of aesthetics, nature and Landschaft, containing articles from both
proponents and opponents of aesthetic thinking in geography.16 In the light of these
activities, one might ask whether a discussion of the ‘aesthetic debate’ is as dispensable
as it might look at first glance.
What is the debate about?
One of the focal points of the debate is summarized in the title of one of the papers
published in Erdkunde, Gerhard Hard’s ‘ ‘‘Hagia Chora’’: on a newly arisen geomantic
tone in geography’.17 ‘Hagia Chora’ provides a resounding critique of a joint paper by
Reinhard Falter and Ju¨rgen Hasse, ‘Landscape photography and hermeneutics of nat-
ure: the aesthetics of nature in experience and depiction’.18 The latter is beyond doubt
an exceptional piece of work. According to Hard, the outlook of its first author, the
philosopher and geomancer Falter, is characterized by revolutionary conservatism
and anthroposophical spiritualism.19 Hasse, in turn, is said to combine (a residuum
of) Adorno’s dark analyses20 with Hermann Schmitz’s phenomenology of the feeling-
body.21 As the authors project these approaches onto the symbolic, emotional and
spiritual meaning of (true) Landschaft, which, as a consequence, appears as ‘Hagia
Chora’ – as ‘sacred landscape’22 – the paper conveys a sort of ‘landscape racism’,
making out true and harmonious landscapes deemed superior to (supposedly) less true
and harmonious ones:23
It is absurd to ask whether these [the American] landscapes provide space for anything humane. Their
impact is indestructible. As such, they provoke the aspiration of the European who has to tread carefully
if he [sic] does not want to tread anything down. The European longs for wildness, mistaking it for crude
incivility. However, one tends to forget that it is only in Europe or in contrastable landscapes (East Asia)
that culture in the manner of a Mozart symphony or of a Chinese landscape picture could come into
existence . . . . The American way of life [in contrast to the European or the Chinese way of life] corre-
sponds . . . to landscapes where one cannot be at home; it derives from the fundamental incapacity still
to understand at all what it means to be at home.24
Since such ‘landscape racism’ entails crude landscape determinism, it is unlikely that
geographical journals will provide a further stage for joint papers by Falter and Hasse.25
Likewise, the following remarks will focus less on Falter’s nature-religiousness and
more on Hasse’s sensualism. This is not to say that Falter alone was to blame for the
political implications of the paper while Hasse’s work could be easily divorced from
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the landscape-racist tendency. It is merely to say that elsewhere Hasse focuses less on
the sacred spirit of particular landscapes and their alleged healing forces. Characterized
by a somewhat postmodern approach to the ambivalence of ‘things’ in an aestheticized
reality,26 these other writings more broadly reflect on sensual and bodily experiences of
the environment. Nonetheless, the subtitle of Hard’s ‘Hagia Chora’ – ‘on a newly
arisen geomantic tone in geography’ – can serve as a starting point.
The case that Hard makes is similar to the one made by Kant 200 years ago. Against ‘a
newly arisen noble tone in philosophy’, Kant spoke out against the supposed truths of
intuitive feelings regarded as somehow discharged from logical explication.27 Like
Kant, who stated that ‘the philosopher of the vision’ could not be tolerated by ‘the
police in the realm of science’,28 Hard, among other things, criticizes the intuitionism
expressed in Hasse’s writings. Indeed, it can be argued that the aesthetic thinking of
the latter heavily draws upon intuitive and sensuous (self-)knowledge. Hasse believes
himself to exist in ‘medial’ and ‘fictionalized spaces’ full of decay, ‘false illusiveness’ and
‘ubiquitous illusion’,29 from which only experiences of the feeling-body – including
abruptly ‘awakening’, ‘blitz-’ or ‘shock-like’ moments of potential reconcilement –
can provide relief. Theoretically, these sudden ‘awakenings’ are thought to provide a
way of transcending the fictions of the estranged here and now towards the utopia
of a better life.30 Practically, however, this utopia can never be realized, since all of
its concrete features necessarily run the risk of being complicit with the very illusive
fiction they are deemed to transcend.31
Hasse can thus be regarded (and seems to regard himself) as a ‘melancholic’, suffer-
ing from the ubiquitous systemic colonization of the allegedly decaying and alienating
spaces of social life,32 and as a scholar whose aesthetic approach resembles the
intuition (Anschauung) of the holistic methodology of the traditional geographical
paradigm. Besides this methodological similarity, his ‘aesthetic geography’ echoes
some normative characteristics of Landschaftsgeographie. For Hasse, as well as for
the traditional geographers of Landschaft, contemporary society is characterized by
fragmentation, a triumphal but destructive procession of technology, and a loss of bal-
ance and harmony. Against the lost unity of landscape and human life, (internal) nature
is set as the overarching positive other, the lessons for which humankind has to show
more serious consideration if it does not want to perish.33 Like a hundred years before,
it is suggested that only aesthetic thinking can lead the way to an appropriate
perception of reality, because only aesthetic thinking is able to discern the spectacular
(post)modern illusiveness from a mysteriously occluded ideal reality.34
Remarks on the antagonist’s line of argument
Against such a background, Hard’s echo of Kant’s ‘call for the police’ is legitimate, even
joyous at first sight. Yet, despite its legitimacy and adequacy, Hard’s critique can itself
be criticized. In order to formulate his critique, Hard has to discriminate strategically
between two self-contained entities: a scientifically productive realm, associated with
objectification and rational cognition; and a pre-scientific or everyday realm, con-
sidered as the cradle of subjective and aesthetic irrationality. This is not to say that Hard
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was not aware of the subjective nature of much research and the influence of emotions
on the research process. On the contrary, scientific work, for him, is always
accompanied by ‘reveries and imaginative encounters’,35 aesthetic experiences and
perceptions of the object of study. In a paper published in 1995, for instance, he
sketches out possibilities for setting ‘the two modes of experience in a more fertile,
more subtle and sophisticated, relationship [than had been the case in Landschaftsgeo-
graphie]’.36 And in ‘Hagia Chora’ he submits that ‘the unconscious always participates in
the research process; from its very beginning, analysis is stimulated by emotions (parti-
cularly positive ones). The emotional and libidinal appropriations of the object might
alter as the research process unfolds, but in general they do not weaken but
strengthen.’37 Somewhat surprisingly, though, he seems to regard these appropriations
as strictly separated from the cognitive process of gaining ‘real knowledge’, arguing
that aesthetic experience of the scientific object mainly functions as an obstacle
e´piste´mologique.38
In order to try and formulate an explanation for Hard’s contradictory stance, I turn to
the specific logic already mentioned: the logic that gained currency at the end of the
long-winded and highly controversial process of geographical ‘scientification’, when
the idiographic, holistic and essentialist paradigm of Landschaftsgeographie was finally
replaced with more stringent, social-scientific methodologies. According to this logic,
modern sciences tend to construct their objects of study ‘beyond a rupture e´piste´molo-
gique’, separating the taken-for-granted world of the everyday from the analytic and
reflexive world of rational science.39 The object of Landschaftsgeographie, in contrast,
is said to stem from the aesthetic realm of the former, i.e. the pre-scientific world.
Landschaftsgeographie, it is argued, therefore, represented a prototype – if not the
exceptional example – of a modern science that combined scientific and aesthetic
experience, because both scientific and aesthetic experience coincided in the study
of the object – the Landschaft. When geography finally began to transgress its rupture
e´piste´mologique at the end of the 1960s, however, landscape was gradually replaced by
scientific concepts (space, place and region). As a consequence, aesthetic ‘entry’ into
the objects of study became much more difficult.
From the social-scientific point of view, many contemporary geographers are likely
to compensate for the resulting lack of aesthetic experience and fulfilment by
re-mystifying their objects, promoting geography as a ‘hermeneutics of nature’, ‘social
natural science’ or ‘ecological aesthetics of nature’.40 The resulting outlook of a ‘roman-
tic science’41 is condemned predominantly by those scholars whose intellectual biogra-
phies are, in one way or another, linked to the defeat of Landschaftsgeographie at the
end of the 1960s. For them, the switch-over to the body, as suggested by Hasse, neces-
sarily represents not a renewal of but a regression in geography, which has to be con-
tested if essentialist perceptions – and essentialist concepts – of landscape are to be
foreclosed. In this vein, Hard admits that if his writings were motivated by one single
concern, this would be the saving of ‘the phenomenon of landscape from dull reifica-
tions in the manner of certain landscape geographers’.42
While this might seem strange, from an Anglo-American perspective, endeavours to
contest essentialist and reifying concepts of space and place cannot be underrated in
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German-speaking geography.43 It can be argued, therefore, that this is why Hard, while
allowing the aesthetic dimension a positive role as a stimulus to inquiry, cannot but dis-
miss the aesthetic dimension as irrelevant and misleading when it comes to the actual
realization of scientific research. In other words, it is because of this concern to avoid
essentializing accounts of landscape that Hard cannot but regard truth as a matter of the
logos and not of aesthetic perception. As a consequence, he (re)produces a specific
technique of power in which the theorist draws a distinction, usurps the positive side
of that distinction, and who then by design becomes the master of both sides. Criticized
by postcolonial and feminist scholars, this strategy has been described as l’englobement
du contraire (‘the embracing of the contrary’).44 Like the moralist who takes the very
distinction between good and bad for good, or the jurist who has no doubt that courts
do right when they tell right from wrong, the social scientist knows that (s)he is right
in discerning a realm of scientific truth from another one of mere aesthetic ‘wisdom’:
Real knowledge always presupposes a radical break with . . . inward-fantasies-in-the-outward-world, these
attractive and intimate worlds of images and symbols that always have already occupied the realm of the
scientific object. There is no real knowledge until the ‘rupture e´piste´mologique’ has been transcended.45
Deconstructing the dichotomy
The evaluative distinction standing at the heart of Hard’s critique can be traced back to
Greek philosophy. Plato, polemically banishing the poets from his ideal state in the
10th book of the Republic, conceptualized the perceptions of the senses as inferior
to rational (philosophical) reasoning. This position was, albeit in the very different
philosophical and historical context of the seventeenth century, reproduced through
the writings of Descartes, who codified the Enlightenment with a specific sense of
scientific rationality. Despite the fact that Cartesian philosophy has not gone unchal-
lenged over the centuries since, the belief in a realm of scientific rationality supposedly
superior to the sensuous, fictional and ‘irrational’ realm of the senses has become a
taken-for-granted truth in many quarters.
Yet, the distinction between two separate realms represented a false dichotomy from
its very beginning. It can be argued that Plato ‘invented’ the empire of true philosophi-
cal reasoning as the positive mirror image of poetry and art, which he blamed for offer-
ing nothing but fiction and illusion. Put differently, he required the existence of an
inferior realm as a negative to ‘invent’ the positive sphere of philosophical truth. More
adequately, therefore, the two realms should be regarded as ‘imagined entities’ requir-
ing the existence of each other to come into existence themselves. The distinction
between inferior sensual perception and superior scientific cognition did not ‘fall from
heaven’; it cannot be found in the ‘objects as such’, but only in the languages and ima-
ginations of those who interpret, categorize and valorize (the objects of) the world by
means of it. Involving ‘aesthetics’ is not meant to name a definite sphere, but to make a
distinction: the distinction between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘scientific reason’. The only truth that
we can claim about this distinction is that it is ‘true’ neither out of reach of those who
drew it nor before it was drawn. It represents a matter of context – of culture, of prac-
tice or of interest – but it ‘is’ not per se. Therefore, the scientific and the aesthetic should
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be conceptualized as both interdependent and internally different spaces, not as self-
contained, homogeneous entities.
These ‘purely’ epistemological remarks can be further underlined empirically.46 This
‘empirical deconstruction’ of the demarcation line between the two realms will be
undertaken by ‘interviewing’ – or, rather, interpreting – ‘eyewitnesses’ from either side
of the divide. These interviews will highlight the permanent displacements to which the
boundary between the realm of the body and the realm of the gaze was, and continues
to be, exposed.
In the realm of the gaze
Given these deconstructionist intentions, it might seem strange to write about – and,
thereby, to discern – a realm of the gaze. However, the strategy of this paper is to work
with the body=gaze dichotomy in order to make it productive. Rather than representing
a signifier for the pre-discursive existence of an essential realm of the gaze, the distinc-
tion hence serves as a device on the way to ‘empirical deconstruction’. The ambiv-
alence of this strategy is somehow prefigured by the term ‘gaze’ itself, denoting both
conceptual ocularcentrism and one of the senses.
Accordingly, the first eyewitness to be interviewed did not write solely about the
gaze. On the contrary, he disapproved of the ideal of Cartesian science and annexed
the concrete, the particular and the individual to philosophy, thus upgrading the sup-
posedly inferior capability of the senses. It was Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten who, in
his ‘Aesthetica’ (1750), qualified conceptual truth as poor, abstract and unable to
embrace reality.47 Against the program of ‘exact science’ and conceptual thought, he
introduced the aesthetic to enhance perception by systematic training of the ‘inferior’
senses – a project which, as Eagleton argues, had a stimulating impact on the philo-
sophical Zeitgeist of the eighteenth century:
It is as though philosophy suddenly wakes up to the fact that there is a dense, swarming territory beyond its
own mental enclave which threatens to fall utterly outside its sway. That territory is nothing less than the
whole of our sensate life together – the business of affections and aversions, of how the world strikes the
body on its sensory surfaces, of that which takes root in the gaze and the guts and all that arises from our
most banal, biological insertion into the world. The aesthetic concerns this most gross and palpable dimen-
sion of the human, which post-Cartesian philosophy, in some curious lapse of attention, has somehow
managed to overlook.48
Parallel to its emphasis on the ‘dimension of the human’ – the subjective, the individual,
the sensual and the emotive – Baumgarten’s aesthetic also claimed cognitive grounds.
Defined as the science of how an object was to be perceived sensually, it was thought
of as a complement to traditional philosophical apprehension of the world. ‘True’ cog-
nition, in this approach, was conceptualized as a combination of aesthetic perception
and logical cognition.
Philosophy’s claim to the body, i.e. the aesthetic dimension within cognitive dis-
courses, became even stronger in the aftermath of Baumgarten’s intervention. Accord-
ing to the ‘oldest systematic programme of German idealism’,49 the true and the good
are united only in the beautiful. The ‘highest act of reason’ was stated to be an ‘aesthetic
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act’, and the ‘philosophy of the mind’ (Geist) was regarded as ‘aesthetic philosophy’.50
The new hegemony of the aesthetic was repeated, for instance, in the philosophies of
art of both Hegel and Schelling, where the dynamic of the beautiful resulted from its
very capability to reconcile the true and the good.51 The fact that both Hegel and Schel-
ling not only ‘domesticated’ the arts for philosophical purposes but paradoxically dis-
credited sensual perception52 does not undermine the argument that the demarcation
line between the two realms was shifted far into the realm of the gaze; it points to
the internal differences of the various discourses in the realm of the gaze.
These differences, in turn, highlight the impracticality of subsuming the manifold dis-
courses in the realm of the gaze under the umbrella of one overarching definition. What
unifies the discourses specified above, though, is their embracement of aesthetic per-
ception. According to these discourses, the true cannot unfold without the beautiful,
and neither without the good. The involvement of the latter is revealed, for instance,
in the ‘Critique of the power of judgement’.53 Despite being regarded – paradoxically
or not – as the foundation of aesthetic autonomy,54 the teleological impetus and the
moral imperative of Kant’s philosophy can be easily revealed.55 Many philosophical
discourses, it can be summarized, are imbued with aesthetic implications – as well as
with moral ones.
In the realm of the body
After having explored the lack of essence in the realm of the gaze, the reverse will now be
done for the body. As in the previous subsection, the act of reinforcing the empirical exist-
ence of such an entity merely serves as a strategic move to highlight the contingent nature
of the body=gaze distinction and, thus, of the realm of the body itself. In contrast to the
previous subsection, however, the eyewitnesses are no old philosophers but young artists
who have recently been interviewed for a research project dealing with politically and
socially committed practices of public art as a possible means to revitalize urban land-
scapes.56 Above and beyond its applied aspects in the context of urban planning, this
project also focused on the degree to which artists still work according to the traditional
divide that represents the art world as the province of fiction and illusion, providing
‘loopholes’ of emotional escapism and relief from the hard facts of everyday life.
When I asked the artists about how they perceived themselves and their work, all dis-
tanced themselves from the romantic preconception of the artist as the special curator
of feelings and emotions. For instance, Glasgow-based sculptor Kenny Hunter stated
that there is
a perceived notion of the artist being . . . romantic, being individualistic. Artists are seen as flighty and mad;
that is still a very old, a romantic perception of the artist. Whereas to some degree, actually, people like
myself who work in the public field, probably know more or are exposed to more of the world. Through
my work, I had to . . . communicate with people from different areas. So, to some degree, the artist is open
and should be open to different view points and life styles, which kind of works against . . . the stereotypes.
Moreover, many of them underlined the importance of research for their work, thus
suggesting a decisive closeness to academia. According to Glasgow-based artist
Graham Fagen, the research
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takes a long period time, sometimes years . . . . And maybe for a scientist, it’s the same. Surely, you have an
aim or a goal or a subject area, you spend a very long time researching, and then, once you know what
you can do with it, you can very quickly publish results. But to publish the results is a relatively short and
quick thing, but it’s at the end of a period of research. And I think that’s what I do.
So, are the preconceptions of the sensitive, inward-looking artist all wrong? Where is
the place of emotions in the art world? Kenny Hunter replied that there
is an artist called Anselm Kiefer, and he said that, in order to make art, you needed three things, feeling,
thought and will. And first you must start with a feeling. And then the thought process is to judge whether
that feeling is, you know, important enough . . .or, does it connect with your subject? . . .You’re gonna have
to think about that feeling. And then you need the will to make it happen, to make it physical.
If one needs both feeling – embodied passion – and thought – disembodied ration-
ality – then the question is how they are mediated in the process of doing art. How do
they work together? Graham Fagen asserts that there are
lots of artists who work out with the matter of fact. Work made with that kind of thinking can be very
dry, . . . and obviously very matter-of-fact. And maybe work that is more about emotion, on the other
extreme, can be. . .ridiculous [laughs], because it’s not checked, it’s not thought about in a way that other
people might be able to communicate with. And I guess, like any of these sorts of opposites, the best thing
you can go for is that both things work together and that you find a bit . . .half of one and half of the other
to make a decision.
These are only a few examples, but they indicate how it can be argued that any precon-
ceptionof the artworld being the special curator of emotions is as inadequate as the image
of science as the custodian of ‘emotionless’ rational cognition. This claim returns us to
the assumption that the body’s realm is dependent on the existence of a realm of the gaze,
and that the realm of the gaze, in turn, has always been subjected to sensual temptations.
This conclusion is supported by Plato’s biography. Plato, who downgraded the percep-
tion of the senses andwanted to expel the poets from the ideal state,was not as clear about
assessing the value of the body and the gaze as is often thought.57 He himself had to
be persuaded by Socrates to become a philosopher (and not a poet), and at the end
of the polemic in Republic, he confesses that he articulated his polemics as a spell to
prevent himself from falling again for his old passion: poetry.
Between body and gaze
What are the consequences of – and what are the lessons to be learned from – these
deconstructionist endeavors for the current discussion within and, of course, outside
of German-speaking geography? What are the possible ways of dealing with the aes-
thetic in the light of this deconstruction? The search for an answer to these questions,
which will be given in the conclusion of this paper, can begin with a detour into their
opposite: how should the aesthetic not be conceptualized? The shortest answer to this
question is perhaps: ‘As in the case of the new aesthetic approach to German-speaking
geography’. Taking into account the antagonist’s reinforcement of the traditional pre-
dominance of cognitive and scientific rationality, Hasse’s approach might seem con-
genial because it takes the side of the oppressed. However, it cannot stand as an
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option after the supposed dichotomy between the gaze and the body has been
deconstructed. Apart from the fact, of course, that it now has become difficult to
renew geography on aesthetic grounds, in that such a project would re-establish the
dichotomy between the two realms, there are two principal reasons why this is the
case. In order to explicate them, I will examine the work of the philosopher
Wolfgang Welsch, himself one of the main protagonists of an alleged ‘aesthetic move-
ment’ – the so-called ‘aesthetic turn’58 – and a strong influence on the writings of
Hasse.
First, Welsch regards the present as being essentially aesthetic. In the ‘general process
of the aestheticization of reality’, he witnesses an ‘aestheticization on the surface’ as
well as an ‘in-depth aestheticization’.59 While the former refers, among other things,
to the ‘face-lifting’ of our cities or the hedonistic and spectacular relish of our culture,
the latter ‘concerns basic structures of our reality as such: of our material reality as a
consequence of new technologies, of our social reality due to its medial interme-
diated-ness, and of our subjective reality due to the replacement of moral standards
with self-stylization’.60 What is problematic with this analysis is that the author projects
his assumptions onto the world, where he finds them necessarily validated.61 Put differ-
ently, the problem is that the author mistakes his observations, assumptions and imagi-
nations of the reality for reality.62 In so doing, Welsch reproduces the paradoxical logic
of visibility, in which a particular order of things is made visible and naturalized
because it is seen in the way it is seen.63 After the previous section, one is, more-
over, tempted to ask what such an essentially aestheticized reality might actually look
like – or, more precisely, what might allow us to discern an aestheticized reality
from its rational, cognitive or non-aesthetic antecedent.
The second reason to question the ‘aesthetic turn’ is even more acute. On the basis of
the postulated ‘ontological’ or ‘empirical aestheticization’, Welsch testifies to, and
indeed demands, a subsequent aestheticization of thinking, an ‘epistemological aesthe-
ticization’. If reality becomes more and more aesthetic, so it is argued, then philosophi-
cal exploration and investigation have to draw upon aesthetic categories. As a con-
sequence, we are invited to develop the epistemological aestheticization as it is said
to have already materialized in the writings of Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault, Baudrillard,
Vattimo, Cacciari and, in the German-speaking context, Kamper and Sloterdijk.64 The
aesthetic is regarded as the new prima philosophia or ‘first philosophy’ which is said
to encompass both moral and logical dimensions.65 The problem is that the scholar,
who, like Welsch, postulates an empirical aestheticization and demands, as a conse-
quence, an epistemological aestheticization does not only involve a dubious caus-
ality,66 but reproduces the same effect as the scholar who postulates the dominance
of cognitive or scientific rationality. Nonetheless, there is still a key difference, in that,
whereas the latter regards the truth as the property of rational reason, the former
regards the truth as the property of the aesthetic:
What is crucial . . . is that the aesthetic pertains to . . . the basic dimensions, precisely the fundaments.
‘Rationality’, in contrast – the second essential moment concerning truth – is the decisive factor only with
regards to resulting processes on the basis of strictly aesthetic foundations.67
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The idea of truth independent from position and context, however, has been aban-
doned by various theorists. Whether it be for Foucault how knowledge is linked to
power, or for Derrida how nothing exists outside differential references, or for Rorty
how discourse represents not a reflection of but an intervention in the world68: in their
writings, there is no truth conceivable which is not partial and not somehow dependent
upon the perspective of the actual speaking position. Likewise, for many postcolonial
or feminist scholars, postulating objective truth on the basis of either the cognitive or
the aesthetic equates to a theological operation, because reality is then observed from
the perspective of nowhere. In this vein, Donna Haraway criticizes the ‘god trick of see-
ing everything from nowhere’;69 the god trick of the gaze that ‘makes the unmarked
category claim the power to see and not to be seen, to represent while escaping
representation’.70
Writings such as Haraway’s – writings that take into account the significance of partial
and preliminary thinking – can be regarded as writings between body and gaze. The
reason for this is not so much that they deal with aesthetic phenomena or that, due
to their aesthetic qualities, they can be consumed like art, as argued by Welsch.71
Rather, it is because they break with logocentrism, anthropocentrism, monosemy and
the primacy of the gaze – the traits of rational reason – without falling for the supposed
truth of aesthetic perception or aesthetic thinking.
Conclusion
What can be learned, against such a background, from the deconstructionist endea-
vours according to which there is no such thing as cognition without the body and
no such thing as sensation without the gaze? If the empirical existence of a ‘superior’,
objective and scientific realm, on the one hand, and an ‘inferior’, subjective and aes-
thetic realm, on the other, merely represents the outcome of a discursive distinction,
and did not exist until that distinction, for whatever reasons and in whatever
context, was made, then the rationale of ‘either rational or emotional’ should be
replaced with an in-between perspective. Post-structuralist writings that are aware of
the situated and contingent nature of knowledge, it has been argued, can be concep-
tualized as such writings between the body and the gaze, breaking with the traits of
rational reason without falling for the supposed truth of an ‘aesthetic rationality’. Such
writings can offer alternative ways of dealing with the supposed dichotomy between
the body and the gaze – both within German-speaking geography and beyond.
In the German context, what is in order is a dual strategy that, first and foremost, cri-
ticizes the supposed supremacy of scientific cognition as it is conveyed by the antagon-
ist of aesthetic thinking in geography, but also critiques a simple replacement of
scientific cognition by aesthetic thinking, since such a move would reinstate the dichot-
omous notion of two separate realms. Questioning the gaze’s supremacy should lead
instead to a challenging of the theorists’ reclamation of truth either in the name of scien-
tific rationality or in the name of the aesthetic. The impetus is that we not only carefully
analyse our own positionality (our ‘situatedness in time and space’), but acknowledge
what Pierre Bourdieu termed ‘a much more fundamental and pernicious alteration’:72
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our own involvement in the ‘invention’ of our objects, which, in turn, is linked to parti-
cular theoretical and practical interests at particular times and in particular places.
This impetus also has consequences for some lines of argument within the current
Anglo-American preoccupation with the emotions. Taking into account the interrelat-
edness of the body and the gaze, I am uneasy about the recent attempts to strengthen
the subjective or the emotional in geography, especially when they are combined with
calls for ‘non-constructivist approaches – approaches associated with being and doing,
with ways of knowing that depend on direct experience . . .more so than reflection,
abstraction, translation and representation’.73 Such calls can be problematic for three
interrelated reasons. First, they can lead to a – willing or unwilling – restitution of
the traditional dichotomy between the body and the gaze. Secondly, they run the risk
of simply exchanging the gaze’s supremacy with a superior body – a risk that is even
higher when these calls suggest the possibility of ‘coming closer to truth’ by ‘the disclos-
ure of things subterranean’.74 Thirdly, although my unease does not derive from the
social-scientific logic for which the emotions represent a barrier to real knowledge
(but rather from the insight that there is no ‘real knowledge’ at all), it seems to me that
‘non-constructionist’ or ‘non-representational’ approaches to the social world can, as in
the case of the German-speaking context, prepare the ground for a return to the reify-
ing logic of traditional geographical world-views. These world-views have been over-
come, and should not be introduced again to a discipline talking about a ‘policy turn’
and trying to give ‘the concept of [social and political] relevance a new lease of life’.75
Against this background, it finally becomes obvious that a discussion of the ‘aesthetic
debate’ within German-speaking geography is not as dispensable as it might look at
first. Far from debating quaint topics of mere historical interest, the lessons learned from
the deconstruction of the body/gaze dichotomy can indeed be valuable with regards
to the paradigmatic level of debate. It is perhaps vis-a`-vis an increased popularity of
poststructuralist – or in-between – approaches within German-speaking geography that
Gerhard Hard self-critically asks whether his pronounced reference to social theory is
still relevant in the face of contemporary trans-disciplinary discourses, where the differ-
ences between philosophical, anthropological and social-scientific approaches are
blurred and dissolve into the broader discourse of the humanities.76 Answering this
question is difficult: there are good reasons for insisting on the stringent epistemology
of social theory that forecloses reifications of space by rigorously differentiating
between the ontological modes of the material, the subjective and the social world.
Certainly, taking into account the deterministic logic of the traditional, holistic world-
view, either still unchallenged or (potentially) revitalized by the protagonists of aes-
thetic or emotional approaches to the geographies of contemporary life, it is surely
not the worst strategy. Nonetheless, it seems to be somewhat outdated.
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